The escalating war between the United States, Israel, and Iran has produced what the International Energy Agency has called the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. At the centre of this unprecedented crisis sits the Strait of Hormuz — a narrow waterway between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula through which roughly 20 per cent of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas normally flows. Since late February 2026, tanker traffic through the strait has been reduced to a near standstill after Tehran moved to block commercial vessels in retaliation for joint US-Israeli strikes.
With the strait effectively closed, Saudi Arabia has activated what may be the most strategically important piece of energy infrastructure on the planet: its East-West Crude Oil Pipeline, commonly known as the Petroline. Stretching approximately 1,200 kilometres across the Arabian Peninsula, this pipeline network connects the kingdom’s eastern oil processing facilities to export terminals on the Red Sea coast, allowing crude to reach global markets without passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
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A Pipeline Built for Exactly This Moment
The origins of the Petroline date back to 1981, when Saudi Arabia completed the first pipeline during the Iran-Iraq War. At the time, Riyadh recognised that its total dependence on Gulf maritime routes left its oil exports dangerously vulnerable. The system was designed as sovereign infrastructure built to protect Saudi crude flows from potential maritime disruptions, linking the massive Abqaiq oil processing complex in the Eastern Province to the port city of Yanbu on the Red Sea.
The original configuration consisted of a 48-inch pipeline capable of transporting approximately 1.85 million barrels per day. A second, larger 56-inch line was added during the early 1990s, bringing the system’s standard operational capacity to around 5 million barrels per day. In 2019, Saudi Aramco temporarily expanded the pipeline’s capacity to 7 million barrels per day by converting some parallel natural gas liquids pipelines to carry crude oil. That conversion has now been activated in full once again.
As Jim Krane, an energy research fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute, told Middle East Eye: the pipeline is doing exactly what it was designed to do — bypass the strategic chokepoint of Hormuz if Iran shut it down.
Aramco Ramps Up to Maximum Capacity
Saudi Aramco moved swiftly once the strait became impassable. During a fourth-quarter earnings call on March 10, Aramco CEO Amin Nasser confirmed the company was pushing the pipeline towards its full 7 million barrels per day capacity. Before the crisis, the pipeline was carrying approximately 2.8 million barrels per day from eastern production centres to the Red Sea.
Nasser explained that the abrupt onset of hostilities required an immediate reshuffling of global shipping logistics. Tankers that had been positioned in the Persian Gulf needed to reposition to the Red Sea coast. Of the pipeline’s total 7 million barrels per day capacity, approximately 5 million barrels would be available for export, with around 2 million barrels directed to domestic refineries along Saudi Arabia’s western coast. The pipeline is primarily carrying Arab Light and Arab Extra Light crude grades, which are easier to transport than medium and heavy blends.
Aramco is also prioritising production from lower-cost onshore fields that produce lighter crude, while trimming output of heavier offshore grades that do not move as efficiently through the system. Analysts at CSC Commodities compared the difference to sending water versus treacle through a long pipe.
Yanbu: From Quiet Port to Global Oil Hub
The surge in pipeline flows has transformed the Red Sea port of Yanbu into one of the world’s most important crude export terminals almost overnight. Shipping data from Kpler found that Yanbu averaged 2.2 million barrels per day in the first nine days of March — more than double its pre-war rate. Separately, Windward Maritime AI reported a 330 per cent surge from pre-conflict levels.
According to LSEG and Kpler shipping data, between 37 and 40 tankers are expected to load at Yanbu during March, which could push exports above 4 million barrels per day — a record for the terminal. Before the crisis, the port handled only about two supertanker loadings per month under normal conditions.
However, port infrastructure imposes its own constraints. Yanbu’s two terminals — Yanbu North and Yanbu South — have a nominal combined loading capacity of about 4.5 million barrels per day according to Argus Media, though the operationally tested figure sits closer to 4 million barrels per day. Energy consultancy Vortexa estimated effective terminal capacity at roughly 3 million barrels per day under current wartime conditions. Charter rates to Yanbu doubled in early March, and some fixtures failed because part of the global tanker fleet is avoiding the region altogether.
Lloyd’s List reported that most liftings from Yanbu are being handled by Bahri, Saudi Arabia’s national shipping carrier, underscoring the strategic importance the kingdom is placing on maintaining uninterrupted exports from the Red Sea.
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A Pressure Valve, Not a Full Solution
Despite the pipeline’s critical role, analysts caution that the Petroline cannot fully replace the volumes that normally transit the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia typically exports around 6 to 7 million barrels per day of crude under normal conditions, the vast majority of which previously passed through the strait. By utilising the pipeline at full capacity, the kingdom is managing to sustain roughly 70 per cent of its usual export volumes.
But the broader picture is far more severe. The strait normally carries around 20 million barrels per day of petroleum liquids from multiple Gulf producers. Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain lack comparable bypass infrastructure and have been forced to curtail production dramatically. Iraq began shutting down operations at the Rumaila oil field due to a lack of storage space. Qatar declared force majeure on gas contracts. Kuwait’s petroleum corporation also invoked force majeure. By mid-March, Gulf Arab states had collectively cut production by at least 10 million barrels per day.
The only other significant bypass pipeline in the region is the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP), which runs approximately 248 miles from onshore facilities at Habshan to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. ADCOP can transport about 1.5 million barrels per day, with a total capacity approaching 1.8 million barrels per day. Kpler senior oil analyst Naveen Das told CNBC that ADCOP was operating at 71 per cent utilisation, leaving approximately 440,000 barrels per day of spare capacity.
Together, the Petroline and ADCOP can offset only a fraction of the strait’s normal throughput. As one MercoPress analysis described it, Saudi Arabia has found a pressure valve, not a full solution.
New Security Risks and Infrastructure Strain
While the Petroline allows Saudi crude to avoid the Strait of Hormuz, it introduces a fresh set of vulnerabilities. Oil exported from Yanbu must still pass through the Bab el-Mandeb strait at the southern end of the Red Sea before reaching the Indian Ocean and global shipping lanes. This narrow corridor has been a zone of persistent threats from Yemen’s Houthi forces in recent years, and while no attacks have been reported there since the current conflict began, security analysts warn the risk remains acute.
Kpler’s Naveen Das warned that if Saudi tankers come under attack in the Red Sea, it would signal to the market that all escape routes for oil are being targeted, likely triggering a sharp spike in prices. Greg Priddy, a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest, told Middle East Eye that the pipeline reroute makes the Houthis strategically important in ways they were not before.
Iran has also demonstrated willingness to target Gulf energy infrastructure directly. Drone strikes hit Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery — the kingdom’s largest — in early March, and drones were intercepted over the Shaybah field near the Abu Dhabi border. Abu Dhabi’s state oil company Adnoc shut its Ruwais refinery after a fire caused by a drone strike. These attacks highlight the risk that the pipeline’s western export terminals could themselves become high-value targets.
Running the Petroline continuously at maximum capacity also imposes considerable strain on infrastructure that was originally engineered as a contingency system for short-term disruptions, not sustained full-capacity operations over weeks or months.
The Product Gap Problem
Beyond crude oil, the crisis reveals another critical limitation. The Petroline can transport crude, but it cannot simultaneously carry natural gas liquids and refined petroleum products. Energy consultant Ellen Wald told Middle East Eye that the pipeline cannot both fulfil crude oil contracts and petroleum product demand at the same time.
This matters enormously for Europe in particular. According to Arne Lohmann Rasmussen, chief analyst at Global Risk Management, roughly 30 per cent of Europe’s diesel imports and about half its jet fuel imports were coming from the Middle East at the start of 2026. With the strait closed, refined product supplies to Europe face severe constraints that the pipeline alone cannot resolve.
Oil Markets in Turmoil
The disruption has sent oil prices surging to levels not seen in years. Brent crude topped $106 a barrel by mid-March, with prices rising more than 40 per cent over the course of the month. At its peak, Brent briefly touched nearly $120 a barrel before pulling back.
The IEA coordinated the largest emergency release of crude reserves in history — 400 million barrels — but the market largely shrugged off the announcement. Analysts at Dutch bank ING noted that the only way to see oil prices trade sustainably lower is by reopening the Strait of Hormuz.
The World Economic Forum described the crisis as a structural shock to the world economy, warning that the longer it runs, the more lasting the damage becomes — first hitting oil, gas, shipping and aviation, then feeding through to inflation, industrial costs and food security. Japan relies on the Middle East for about 90 per cent of its crude oil imports, most of which pass through Hormuz. South Korea gets roughly 70 per cent of its crude from the same region. India, with thinner strategic reserves, is considered even more vulnerable to a prolonged disruption.
Other Regional Pipelines and the Road Ahead
Beyond the Petroline and ADCOP, several other pipeline systems in the region play supporting roles, though none can match the scale of infrastructure needed. The Dolphin Gas Pipeline, which transports natural gas from Qatar to the United Arab Emirates and Oman, remains operational and is currently the only channel through which Qatari energy reaches neighbouring markets after tanker shipments were halted.
The Iraq-Turkey Pipeline, linking Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, remains largely offline due to long-standing political disputes between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government. The Basra-Aqaba pipeline, intended to connect Iraqi oil fields with Jordan’s Red Sea port, was accelerated in 2025 but is not yet operational. The historic Tapline pipeline connecting Saudi Arabia to Lebanon’s Mediterranean port of Sidon was shut down in 1990, though discussions have resurfaced about building a modern replacement.
For now, the Petroline remains the single most important piece of bypass infrastructure keeping global oil markets from an even deeper crisis. As Aramco CEO Amin Nasser starkly warned on the earnings call: there would be catastrophic consequences for the world’s oil markets the longer the disruption continues. Whether the Strait of Hormuz reopens in weeks or months will determine not only the fate of Saudi Arabia’s pipeline gambit, but the trajectory of the global economy itself.
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Photo Source: Google
By: Montel Kamau
Serrari Financial Analyst
18th March, 2026
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